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ADDRESSING CORPORATE SHORT-TERMISM
THROUGH LOYALTY SHARES
P. ALEXANDER QUIMBY
ABSTRACT
The classic concept of patient investing and long-term corporate governance has largely
disappeared. Dispersed investors with long-term investment horizons have been replaced by
concentrated institutional investors, which trade and control corporations solely for the shortterm. This new model of investment and corporate governance (deemed “short-termism”) has a
negative impact on society as a whole and has been blamed for recent financial crises and a
lack of investment in research and development.
Although others have addressed short-termism, their efforts generally avoid providing
actual solutions to the problem. This Note fills that void: it provides a model for promoting
long-term investment and corporate governance, while not eliminating the benefits conferred
by short-term trading. This goal can be accomplished by making a “loyalty shares” provision
available to public corporations. By adopting a loyalty shares provision, the gains generated
from the sale of that corporation’s stock would be subject to a periodically reduced capital
gains tax rate over time, while the voting rights attached to that stock would be periodically
enhanced over time. Adoption of the provision would entice more shareholders to invest for
the long-term, while also increasing these long-term shareholders’ control over the corporation. Mindful of the experiences of European and Canadian companies that use other types
of control-enhancing mechanisms, this proposal contains several features which avoid the
pitfalls inherent in an uncapped system of enhanced voting rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the American corporation1 originated as a vehicle to
promote the public good,2 that primary purpose slowly eroded and
J.D. 2012, summa cum laude, Florida State University College of Law. I would
like to thank Professor Jay Kesten for his insightful comments and suggestions throughout the development of this piece. I am also grateful to Professor Steve R. Johnson for his
valuable feedback.
1. For the sake of consistency, I refer to United States publicly traded companies
as “corporations” throughout this paper, although they can exist in other forms. See, e.g.,
FAQs, KKR FINANCIAL HOLDINGS LLC, http://ir.kkr.com/kfn_ir/kfn_faq.cfm (last visited
Feb. 18, 2013).
2. See William Haft, Charter Schools and the Nineteenth Century Corporation: A
Match Made in the Public Interest, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1023, 1028 (1998) (explaining how,
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gave way to a new fixation: increasing shareholder wealth.3 This shift
in purpose is particularly important due to the significant role public
corporations play in the United States: in the economic context, the
increasing interconnectedness of markets has allowed Wall Street to
substantially affect Main Street;4 politically, the Supreme Court’s
controversial Citizens United5 decision opened the door even wider
than before for large corporations to wield great influence through
political spending;6 and the products, services, and messages of these
corporations help shape American (and world) culture.7 Yet even as
the goal of individual corporations has changed, the justification for
their existence is still premised—at least in part—on the belief that
they confer an overall benefit to society.8
historically, states granted authority to public and private corporations to undertake specific activities, and how even private corporations “existed largely to serve a public good”).
3. See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87
VA. L. REV. 1279, 1282 (2001) (describing the prominent view that corporations and managers have a duty to maximize value for shareholders); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Human Freedom
and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications of Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behaviour, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 264 (2008) (“[T]he American corporate law question of the corporation’s purpose has been settled in favour of stockholders.”).
4. See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 10 (2009) (“Rippling effects from a worsening economy
have trickled down from Wall Street into Main Street as the capital markets—the pipes
through which money flows to finance student loans, car loans, home loans, family
needs, and small businesses' payroll and inventory – [sic] fell victim to the credit
freeze. These drastic events have reverberated far beyond the trading floors of Wall
Street and board rooms of corporate America, as almost no industry has been spared
as the crisis that first emerged in the subprime mortgage market metastasized.”);
John C. Bogle, Restoring Faith in Financial Markets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703436504574640523013840290.html (noting that in recent decades “the financial sector became the driving force in the U.S. economy”).
5. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
6. The Court struck down a federal law banning corporations from using their general treasury funds to make independent, election-related expenditures. Id. at 913; see also
President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) in 156 CONG. REC.
H418 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010) (“I believe [the Court’s decision] will open the floodgates for
special interests . . . to spend without limit in our elections. I don’t think American elections should be bankrolled by America’s most powerful interests . . . .”); Ofer Raban, Constitutionalizing Corruption: Citizens United, Its Conceptions of Political Corruption, and the Implications for Judicial Elections Campaigns, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 359, 382 (2011) (interpreting
the Court’s decision as the “constitutionalization of political corruption”).
7. See Jena McGregor, The World’s Most Influential Companies, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, (Dec. 10, 2008), http://images.businessweek.com/ss/08/12/1211_most_
influential/2.htm (listing American public companies Apple, Wal-Mart, Google, Microsoft,
and others as among the most influential in the world).
8. See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 28 (2d ed. 2009) (stating the normative “objective of corporate law–as of any branch of law—is presumably to serve the interests of society as a
whole”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act
and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 2 (2010) (“I believe that the generation of durable
wealth for its stockholders through fundamentally sound economic activity, such as the
sale of useful products and services, is the primary goal of the for-profit corporation. . . .
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But over the last several decades the manner in which public corporations operate has changed drastically, in a way that threatens
the nation’s long-term well-being. The familiar concept of public stock
being owned by individual American citizens has largely disappeared.9 Instead, institutional investors—entities that pool together
and then invest the money of numerous end-user investors (both
companies and individuals)—are now the dominant holders of public
stock and wield substantial influence over corporate boards of directors.10 The rise of institutional investors has coincided with the rise of
short-termism: the practice of short-term investing by shareholders
and short-term business decisions by directors and managers at the
expense of long-term corporate sustainability.11 It was this type of
short-termism that contributed to recent financial crises12 and also
poses serious problems for the nation going forward, including a lack
of investment in research and development (R&D) and increased
market volatility.13
Although Congress, scholars, and other commentators have
sought to alleviate the problem of short-termism, their efforts have
largely been either misguided or too passive. For example, the DoddFrank Act and other legislative measures endorsed increased shareholder empowerment as a way to ameliorate short-termism, yet ignored the fact that the very shareholders they were empowering had
primarily short-term interests.14 Others have often devoted their time

The hoped-for outcome of this risk taking, in the aggregate, is an increase in societal
wealth, and not simply through the generation of profits. Rather, to generate profits, corporations have an incentive to employ workers and develop innovative products and services,
and to engage in other activities that increase societal wealth.”).
9. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1275 (2008) (“This situation [where most shareholders were individuals] has changed dramatically with the rise of the ‘institutional investor.’ ”).
10. See id. at 1275-76 (describing how “[i]nstitutions have captured a larger and larger share of the total market for public equities over time” and “are in a much more favorable position to play an activist role in corporate governance than dispersed individual
investors are”).
11. See Strine, supra note 8, at 10-11 (describing short-termism and stating “institutional investors often have a myopic concern for short-term performance” and short-term
“trading patterns give fund managers little reason to think deeply about the effect of corporate governance proposals on long-term corporate performance”).
12. See THE CONFERENCE. BD. COMM’N ON PUB. TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 17 (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.conference-board.org/
pdf_free/SR-03-04.pdf (“The Commission believes that managing for short-term earnings
and stock price results has led to many of the behaviors and manipulations that have resulted in the recent corporate crises and loss of investor confidence.”).
13. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
14. See Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership
from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1822-23 (2011) (describing Dodd-Frank and its
bailout antecedents as “misguided and counterproductive[,]” and noting “[e]ach regulatory
measure fails to take account of the short-termist shareholder problem”). The SEC’s proposed Rule 14a-11 would have addressed short-termism, as it required proxy materials to
include a candidate nominated by a group (or individual) of shareholders who have contin-
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to analyzing why short-termism is a problem without providing a solution15 or have offered only general guidance, rather than specific
proposals, for policy-makers to adopt.16
In this Note, I propose a plan that would reduce short-termism to
a healthy level. This proposal advocates for the availability of a “loyalty shares” provision to public corporations. If a corporation adopts a
loyalty shares provision, the gains generated when an investor sells
that corporation’s common stock would be subject to a periodically
reduced capital gains tax rate, while the voting rights attached to
that stock would be periodically enhanced. The immediate result of
this proposal would be a renewed focus on long-term corporate
health; the broader result would be a corporate sector that is more
prosperous, stable, and beneficial to society.
II. THE RISE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND SHORT-TERMISM
Both the identity of shareholders and how they invest changed
drastically during the twentieth century. Historically, shareholders
were dispersed individuals with modest holdings of public stock.17
Because shareholders elect directors and directors make business
decisions that are carried out by their managers, scholars of the time
were largely concerned with the inability of shareholders to exert influence over the corporations they owned.18 Adolf Berle and Gardiner
uously held at least 3% of the voting power for at least three years. See Bus. Roundtable v.
SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2011). But the rule was invalidated. Id. at 1148.
15. See, e.g., Rodrigues, supra note 14, at 1866 (“This Article makes no attempt to
offer a grand solution to the resulting problems [of short-termism]. Instead, it focuses on
bringing those problems into clearer view.”); Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of ShortTermism, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 630 (2011) (stating “the problem of short-termism
is very real” but focusing on why managers focus on the short-term, why a company would
benefit from short-term management, and how short-termism falsely inflates a company’s
stock price).
16. See, e.g., David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of
Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 435, 467-71 (2010) (stating “[this article] analyzes and
critiques existing regulatory proposals, and, although not endorsing a regulatory solution,
offers two ideas that policy makers should consider” and “[g]iven the considerable uncertainty . . . caution is warranted in drafting any potential regulations”) (emphasis added);
Strine, supra note 8, at 2 (suggesting “some modest moves toward addressing this substantial policy dilemma”); A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & John P. DiTomo, Practicing Law Institute,
The Short-Term vs. Long-Term Dilemma, in NINTH ANNUAL DIRECTORS' INSTITUTE ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 125, 136-37, (2011) (outlining general steps which can be taken
to address short-termism—including preferential tax treatment, encouraging “directors
to become educated about the benefits of long-term thinking[,]” attaching “stockholder
participation rights to minimum holding requirements[,]” and requiring greater disclosure
in certain situations—but not elaborating on the best methods for these proposals to
be implemented).
17. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 9, at 1275 (describing the shareholder powerlessness that resulted from “dispersed small investors whose individual interests were so
small that it did not make sense for any single one of them, alone, to take an active role in
corporate affairs”).
18. Id. at 1274-75.
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Means famously characterized the weak control shareholders possessed as a “separation of ownership and control.”19 Over the years,
common reform efforts aimed at narrowing that separation included
increasing proxy access and disclosure.20
But the classic portrait of dispersed, weak shareholders slowly
changed.21 Individual investors were gradually replaced with institutional investors.22 These new pooled investment vehicles came in
many shapes, sizes, and names: including mutual, hedge, pension,
insurance, and index funds.23 The rise of institutional investors over
the last seventy-five years has been startling. In 1950, institutional
investors held only 8% of outstanding public stock.24 That number
skyrocketed to 51% by 2000, 61% by 2005,25 and reached nearly 70%
of all public stock in 2010.26 Of that number, mutual funds alone control 26%, while private pension plans and government pension plans
own 11% and 9%, respectively.27
The rise of institutional investors may initially seem like a positive. Because institutional investors aggregate tremendous amounts
of stock and, consequently, tremendous amounts of votes, they are
better positioned than their dispersed predecessors to play an activist
role in corporate governance.28 This reality suggests Berle and
Means’s concern with the separation of ownership from control is
outdated.29 Indeed, examples of institutional investors accomplishing
their goals include changing CEO compensation to be primarily tied
to their corporations’ stock price, widespread adoption of majority
voting statutes, and huge stock buyback programs.30

19. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.
VATE PROPERTY 70, 84 (1932).

& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-

See Rodrigues, supra note 14, at 1822.
See id. at 1828.
Id.
See G. William Domhoff, Pension Fund Capitalism or Wall Street Bonanza?,
WHO RULES AMERICA? (Apr. 2010), http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/
pension_fund_capitalism.html.
24. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 9, at 1275.
25. Press Release, The Conference Bd., U.S. Institutional Investors Continue to
Boost Ownership of U.S. Corps. 1 (Jan. 22, 2007) (on file with The Business Lawyer), available at http://www2.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/
01-22-2007/0004510379&EDATE=.
26. Bogle, supra note 4.
27. Id.
28. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 9, at 1276.
29. See Leo E. Strine Jr., Why Excessive Risk-Taking Is Not Unexpected, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 5, 2009, 1:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/dealbook-dialogue-leo-strine/
(“[T]here is now a separation of ‘ownership from ownership’ that creates conflicts of its own
that are analogous to those of the paradigmatic, but increasingly outdated, Berle-Means
model for separation of ownership from control.”).
30. See Strine, supra note 8, at 14-16 (detailing some of the changes achieved by
institutional investors).
20.
21.
22.
23.
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But while the problem evidenced by Berle and Means’s characterization has declined, a new characterization—replete with its own
problems—has emerged. Corporate governance is now faced with a
“separation of ‘ownership from ownership.’ ”31 One difficulty is that
the existing model of corporate law focuses solely on the fiduciary
duties corporate managers owe to their shareholders, to the exclusion
of the end-users who fund those shareholders.32 Moreover, institutional investors may invest in a manner inconsistent with their endusers’ long-term goals.33 Also, “in most institutions the persons
charged with making investment decisions have relatively little or no
responsibility for voting the institution’s portfolio shares.”34 The fact
that many institutional investors rely on the voting advice of proxy
advisory firms adds even more separation between end-users and
boards of directors.35
But while those problems are concerning, the most serious threat
to American public corporations stems from their shareholders’ investment time horizons. Just as the existence of individual investors
gradually gave way to institutional investors,36 the reality of patient,
long-term investing acquiesced to short-termism.37 As institutional
investors competed to attract new end-users every quarter by posting
the most impressive returns,38 their portfolios began turning over at
31. See Strine, supra note 29.
32. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 9, at 1265 (describing how, generally, officers
and directors only owe fiduciary duties to shareholders); Strine, supra note 8, at 10 (“The
existing model of corporate law focuses solely on the duties managers owe to stockholders.
It does not address the reality that most ‘stockholders’ are now themselves a form of agency, being institutional investors who represent end-user investors.”). In describing the disparity between directors and end-users, Vanguard founder John Bogle wrote: “[I]n this
Alice-in-Wonderland world of the financial markets, the investor feeds at the bottom of the
food chain.” Bogle, supra note 4.
33. See Strine, supra note 8, at 12 (“The focus of many of these institutions on quarterly earnings and other short-term metrics is fundamentally inconsistent with the objectives of most of their end-user investors, people saving primarily for two purposes, to put
their kids through college and to fund their own retirements. These end-user investors
do not care about quarterly earnings or short-term gimmicks. These end-user investors
want corporations to produce sustainable wealth that will be there when they need it.”)
(footnotes omitted).
34. Charles M. Nathan, The Parallel Universes of Institutional Investing and
Institutional Voting, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN.
REG. (Apr. 6, 2010, 9:01 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/04/06/
the-parallel-universes-of-institutional-investing-and-institutional-voting/ (stating that,
although this practice is not universal, “it is by far the prevailing paradigm”).
35. Id. (detailing the range of practices used by some fund managers, “from outsourcing the mechanics for actually voting shares . . . , to making recommendations on how to
vote all portfolio companies’ shares on all matters brought to shareholder meetings, to
exercising discretionary proxy authority to vote the portfolio companies’ shares without
reference to the investment manager”).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
37. See supra text accompanying note 11.
38. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 561, 580 (2006) (“[W]idespread availability of information on fund performance[] has led
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an alarming rate. “In 2009, the average stock turnover appears to
have exceeded 250% (changed hands two and a half times), compared to
78% a decade ago, and 21% barely 30 years ago.”39 Mutual funds—which
are the primary 401(k) contribution investors for Americans40—turn
over 117% of their stock portfolio a year,41 while hedge funds turn over
300% annually.42 The presence of short-termism from other vantage
points is also readily apparent. The stockholder base of public companies now turns over nearly 100% every year.43 On the New York
Stock Exchange, stocks were held for—on average—between five and
nine years from 1945 to 1975, for three years by 1980, and for less
than one year by 2005.44 Overall, the average holding period for
United States equities is just six months.45
But the proliferation of institutional investors has broader consequences than just short-term trading; it also impacts corporate governance. These short-term investors are unlikely to be concerned
with, much less promote, policies that are beneficial to the corporation in the long-term.46 When shareholders have short-term goals,
they elect directors with similar interests and apply subsequent pressure to ensure these goals are met.47 This results in managers engag-

to pressure on mutual fund managers to maximize short-term returns at the expense of
any longer-term focus in order to attract and retain investors.”); Roberta S. Karmel, Should
a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional Shareholders?, 60 BUS. LAW. 1, 18
(2004) (describing how institutional investors “seek quarter-to-quarter and year-to-year
performance statistics that are better than those of their peers”).
39. Bogle, supra note 4.
40. See Strine, supra note 8, at 10.
41. Brian Reid & Kimberlee Millar, Mutual Funds and Portfolio Turnover, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE (Nov. 17, 2004), http://www.ici.org/pdf/rc_v1n2.pdf; see also
Strine, supra note 8, at 10 n. 32.
42. Strine, supra note 8, at 10.
43. Id. at 17.
44. See MICHAEL C. THOMSETT, GETTING STARTED IN STOCK INVESTING AND TRADING
99-100 (2011). Furthermore, the annual turnover of stocks traded on the NYSE reached
over 138% in 2008, compared to 88% in 2000 and 36% in 1980. See Strine, supra note 8, at
10 n.32, 11 n.35.
45. Sparks & DiTomo, supra note 16, at 129.
46. See BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, THE ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A
CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2
(2009), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/
overcome_short_state0909_0.pdf (“[F]und managers with a primary focus on short-term
trading gains have little reason to care about long-term corporate performance or externalities, and so are unlikely to exercise a positive role in promoting corporate policies . . . that
are beneficial and sustainable in the long-term.”). Note that the coalition who provided this
report was comprised of many influential investors, including Warren Buffett and John
Bogle. Id.
47. See Brian J. Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over
Long-Run Value?, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 207, 229 (2001) (presenting empirical evidence
that short-term institutions “exhibit preferences consistent with a short-term focus, supporting [the] view that this type of investor is most likely to create pressure for strong
short-term earnings performance”).
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ing in short-term tactics at the expense of long-term strategies.48 Additionally, institutional investors who tend to focus on short-term
performance are associated with low information quality,49 as well as
weak monitoring and a weak bargaining position in acquisitions.50
Of course, just because there has been a fundamental shift in how
shareholders invest and control corporate governance does not, in
and of itself, tell us that the overall effect is negative. After all, high
frequency trading increases liquidity and market efficiency, while
reducing trading costs through increased competition.51 And at least
two authors have concluded that short-term trading by institutional
investors is positively related to future stock returns and earnings.52
But while short-term trading and corporate governance can confer
some benefits on the market, widespread short-termism delivers
overwhelmingly negative effects.
III. WHY SHORT-TERMISM MUST BE CONFRONTED
“[I]n the short run the market is a voting machine, but in the long
run it is a weighing machine.”
-Benjamin Graham53

48. See MERCER & THE IRRC INSTITUTE, INVESTMENT HORIZONS: DO MANAGERS DO
WHAT THEY SAY? 15, available at http://www.ifa.com/articles/Mercer_IRRC_Study.pdf
(reporting, in a case study analysis of fund managers, that “[w]hen the discussion turned
from the implications for them as fund managers to the wider market impacts, almost all
the managers observed that short-termism can encourage short-term thinking among corporations, which can distract corporate directors from their strategy and potentially undermine long-term shareholder value”); Strine, supra note 8, at 16 (“As a whole, institutional investors have pushed for corporate managers to be highly responsive to the immediate pressures and incentives of the capital markets[,]” which can result in “an agenda
that [does not] appropriately focus[] on the long term . . . .”).
49. See Natasha Burns et al., Institutional Ownership and Monitoring: Evidence from
Financial Misreporting, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 443, 443 (2010) (“[T]he likelihood and severity of
financial misreporting is positively related to aggregate institutional ownership and this
effect can be largely attributed to ownership by institutions with short investment horizons—those with little incentive to engage in costly monitoring of firm activities and precisely those that sell at the announcement of a [financial] restatement.”).
50. See José-Miguel Gaspar et al., Shareholder Investment Horizons and the Market
for Corporate Control, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 135, 135-36 (2005).
51. See Cameron Smith, Commentary: How High Frequency Trading Benefits All Investors, TRADERS MAG. ONLINE (Mar. 17, 2010), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/
high-frequency-trading-benefits-105365-1.html?zkPrintable=true.
52. See Xuemin (Sterling) Yan & Zhe Zhang, Institutional Investors and Equity Returns: Are Short-Term Institutions Better Informed?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 893, 893 (2009)
(“[T]he positive relation between institutional ownership and future stock returns . . . is
driven by short-term institutions. Furthermore, short-term institutions’ trading forecasts
future stock returns. . . . Short-term institutions’ trading is also positively related to future
earnings surprises.”).
53. Jason Zweig, Commentary on BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR:
THE DEFINITIVE BOOK ON VALUE INVESTING 477 (rev. ed. 2003). Graham’s description of the
market highlights one of the problems underlying short-termism: The ability of short-run
price movements to be driven by factors unrelated to the corporation’s actual intrinsic value.
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The pervasiveness of short-termism among institutional investors
challenges one of the basic rationales for how the corporate structure
is designed: Shareholder voting rights are premised on the theory
that shareholders have an interest in increasing the firm’s long-term
profitability.54 Shareholders’ incentives are supposed to be aligned
with the maximization of firm profitability because they are residual
claimants.55 “But in corporate polities, unlike nation-states, the citizenry can easily depart and not ‘eat their own cooking.’ As a result,
there is a danger that activist stockholders will make proposals motivated by interests other than maximizing the long-term, sustainable
profitability of the corporation.”56
The question that must be asked is, “What long-term policies will
corporations give up to appease short-term shareholders?” One of the
most concerning answers is investment in research and development.57 When a corporation’s stock is owned “by institutions that
have high portfolio turnover and engage in momentum trading . . .
the probability that managers [will] reduce R&D [investment] to reverse an earnings decline” significantly increases.58 In contrast, high
proportions of ownership by institutions with low portfolio turnover
and longer-term holdings have “no incremental impact” on the likelihood of cuts in R&D.59
The inverse relationship between short-termism and R&D investment is especially concerning when viewed alongside other R&D
trends. Over the years, the scientific and technological advances
made by United States companies have created new industries, new
jobs, and an improved standard of living for Americans.60 But in the

54. See Strine, supra note 8, at 8 (“The rights given to stockholders to make proposals
and vote on corporate business are premised on the theory that stockholders have an interest in increasing the sustainable profitability of the firm.”).
55. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 470 (2002)
(“[S]hareholders have the strongest economic incentive to care about the size of the residual claim, which means they have the greatest incentive to elect directors committed to maximizing firm profitability.”).
56. Strine, supra note 8, at 8.
57. Brian J. Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT. REV. 305, 305 (1998); see also Strine, supra note 8, at 3 (“To build
wealth in a durable manner, corporations need to commit capital to long-term endeavors,
often involving a lag time between the investment of capital and the achievement of profit,
a long time during which activities like research and development occur.”).
58. See Bushee, supra note 57, at 305.
59. See id. at 310-11, 328-30.
60. See Nat’l Sci. Bd., Research and Development: Essential Foundation for U.S.
Competitiveness in a Global Economy, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Jan. 2008),
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsb0803/start.htm (“The scientific and technological advances
that have led to our Nation’s remarkable ability to create new industries and jobs, improve
the standard of living for people, and provide sophisticated technology that ensures our
national security can be traced back to the outcomes of basic research.”).
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past decade industry support for its own basic research has stagnated.61
Meanwhile, the federal government has decreased its support of academic R&D and basic research.62 These reductions could have serious
implications on the ability of the United States to compete for highly
skilled and manufacturing jobs at home and in international markets.63 Overall, the continued rise of short-termist institutional investors and the decline in R&D investment which accompanies it is likely
to exacerbate this problem in the future.
Short-term corporate governance can also result in corporations
foregoing other important long-term strategies. For example, corporations may be too impatient to wait for appropriate regulatory approval before bringing new products into the market.64 Corporations
may also choose to generate short-term earnings at the expense of
building crucial new factories65 or making other necessary capital investments.66 Additionally, managers may terminate workers if it will
result in an increase in short-term earnings.67
Besides short-termism’s negative influence on corporate governance, excessive short-term trading can also directly cause problems
in the market. The intense focus on short-term speculation has
caused stock prices, rather than more reliable fundamentals, to take
center stage in the eyes of many investors.68 One result has been an
increase in volatility, in that “stocks that are mostly held by short[term] investors experience . . . more severe price drops and larger
price reversals than those mostly held by long[-term] investors.”69
Moreover, the prevalence of investors with short investment horizons
causes, in the aggregate, “market-wide negative shocks.”70

61. Id. (stating “U.S. industry and the Federal Government are the primary pillars of
financial support for the U.S. [R&D] enterprise” but “industry support for [its] own basic
research has stagnated over the last several years”).
62. Id. (stating “Federal Government support for academic R&D began falling in 2005
for the first time in a quarter century” and federal support for basic research has stagnated
in recent years).
63. Id.
64. See Sparks & DiTomo, supra note 16, at 128.
65. Id.
66. See John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial
Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 32-35 (2005) (surveying the CFOs of 400 major corporations and revealing they would have been willing to lay off workers, delay necessary capital
investment, and cut R&D budgets in order to meet quarterly stock price projections).
67. See id.
68. See Bogle, supra note 4 (“The momentary illusion of the price of a stock took center stage, replacing the enduring reality of the company’s intrinsic value—the discounted
value of its future cash flow.”).
69. See Cristina Cella et al., Investors’ Horizons and the Amplification of Market
Shocks 34 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656723
(presenting statistical evidence that stocks held by short-term investors exhibit higher
volatility than those held by long-term investors).
70. See id. at 1.
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Even more troubling, short-termism can incentivize the type of
excessive risk-taking and financial gimmickry that was prevalent in
recent financial crises.71 For example, when investors, executives,
and directors obsessively traded mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations to generate short-term profits, they failed
to adequately asses the long-term risks and complexity of their investments.72 And when investors’ continued demand for ever-higher
returns could not be met legitimately, they were sometimes met
by fraud.73 The pressure applied to executives by investors hungry
for quarterly profits has also been cited as one cause of the disaster
at Enron.74
As discussed previously, institutional investors are better positioned to influence corporate governance than their dispersed predecessors.75 But so long as the investors who determine the fate of their
directors are unconcerned with the long-term, we should not expect
corporations to be concerned with the long-term.76 And while many
have criticized managers for being unresponsive to shareholders, it is
disingenuous to then disparage those managers for failing to resist
shareholders’ demands for risky short-term strategies.77
Although there are some benefits to short-term trading and shortterm corporate governance which should not be disregarded,78 our
current system can be improved by reducing the overall level of
short-termism. One reason such a reduction would be beneficial is
because institutional investors with long-term investment horizons
are associated with more efficient monitoring than their short-term
counterparts.79 Additionally, corporations managed for the long-term
71. See THE CONFERENCE BD., supra note 12, at 17; Sparks & DiTomo, supra note 16,
at 128 (“[A]s evidenced by the recent financial crisis, short-termism may incentivize excessive risk-taking.”); Strine, supra note 8, at 17 (stating the agenda of short-termists “has been
on increasing stock prices as fast and as much as possible, even if that requires financial
gimmickry and risk”).
72. Sparks & DiTomo, supra note 16, at 128.
73. Id.
74. Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate
Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 324 n.110 (“Also familiar
are the accounting shenanigans leading to the doom of Enron and other notorious corporations. Many blame such bad behavior on the pressure brought on executives by investors
hungry for quarterly profits.”).
75. See supra text accompanying note 28.
76. See Strine, supra note 8, at 1-2 (“[W]hy should we expect corporations to chart a
sound long-term course of economic growth, if the so-called investors who determine the
fate of their managers do not themselves act or think with the long term in mind?”).
77. Id. at 17 (“It is contradictory to demand managerial responsiveness to stockholder
sentiment, and then criticize managers for failing to resist stockholder demands for riskier
business strategies and more highly levered balance sheets.”).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
79. See NAJAH ATTIG ET AL., N. FIN. ASS’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT HORIZON,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL, 3, available at
https://secure.northernfinance.org/2011/Submissions/modules/request.php?module=oc_
program&action=view.php&id=333 (“First, descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
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are more apt than those managed for the short-term at creating stable employment, wealth, and goodwill.80 Moreover, because most
well-developed business plans are projected beyond a one- to twoyear horizon,81 a corporation governed with a disproportionate focus
on short-term earnings is ill-equipped to grow in a sustainable way.
The desire to see a renewed corporate focus on long-term strategies is not new. Numerous investors and scholars already support
a greater level of long-term focus by shareholders and corporations.82 The remainder of this Note outlines how this goal can actually
be accomplished.
IV. PROMOTING LONG-TERM INVESTMENT AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Loyalty Shares
To contend with short-termism, a proposal is needed that incentivizes long-term stock ownership and allows long-term owners to have
increased influence. This can be accomplished by allowing public corporations to adopt a “loyalty shares”83 provision in their charter or
bylaws. If a corporation chooses to adopt a loyalty shares provision,
two results would follow.

reveal heterogeneity in the investment horizon of institutional investors. Second, in multivariate regressions that control for industry and year fixed effects as well as other firmlevel determinants, we find that a long-term investment horizon is associated with significantly lower equity financing costs. This finding is consistent with our conjecture that institutions with long horizons are associated with more efficient monitoring than institutions with short horizons, possibly because the latter tend to focus more on short-term performance and hence have less incentive to invest in monitoring.”).
80. Rodrigues, supra note 14, at 1826 (“It is in everyone’s best interest for firms to be
run for the long term. Stable firms create stable employment, wealth, and goodwill that
short-lived companies cannot provide.”); see also Jackson, supra note 74, at 324 (recounting
how some “corporate boards began to make increasingly short-term decisions that proved
ruinous not only for the long-term survival of companies themselves, but also for their employees, creditors, suppliers and other stakeholders”).
81. See Sparks & DiTomo, supra note 16, at 128 (“Most if not all well-developed business plans project the corporation’s goals out beyond a 1- to 2-year horizon.”).
82. For example, famed investor Warren Buffett and Vanguard founder John Bogle,
among many others, formed a coalition which provided recommendations “[e]ncouraging
investors and intermediaries representing investors to adopt a long-term perspective.” See
BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, supra note 46, at 1-2. The Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr. of the Delaware Court of Chancery called for a longer-term focus by investors and corporations, and
stated “[m]any of the leading voices in the institutional investor community agree that
corporations should be managed for the long term.” See Strine, supra note 8, at 3 n.4.
83. “Loyalty shares” is a term sometimes used to describe the shares of French companies which double in voting power after a certain period of time. See INST. S’HOLDER
SERVS. ET AL., REPORT ON THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 18
(2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/
study/final_report_en.pdf. Although (as will be explained) the “loyalty shares” envisioned
in this proposal differ from those used in France, the term will be used for the remainder of
this paper.
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First, the voting rights attached to each share of common stock
would gradually increase over time to ensure corporate boards receive a healthy amount of influence from long-term shareholders. Accompanying provisions related to voting rights ceilings, transparency, and conflicts of interest would be included as default rules to prevent the potentially negative results of enhanced voting rights.
Second, when a corporation adopts the loyalty shares provision,
the capital gains generated when an investor sells that corporation’s
stock would be taxed in a gradually decreasing manner—based on
how long the investor held the stock. The effect would be that shareholders have adequate incentives to hold stock for the long term. As
discussed supra, long-term ownership has reached an anemic level.84
Without properly incentivizing investors to hold stock for the longterm, step one of this proposal might be meaningless; there would
likely be an insignificant number of investors capable of taking advantage of the enhanced voting rights. Apart from the benefits that
enhanced control and reduced tax liability separately confer to the
shareholder, they also maintain a symbiotic relationship: A shareholder with increasing control of corporate governance benefits by
influencing the implementation of sound, long-term corporate policies
because its investment receives increasingly favorable tax treatment
over time.
B. Enhanced Voting Rights
1. The Method of Enhancing Voting Rights
Generally speaking, a single share of common public stock is entitled to one vote on any matters brought before the shareholders at a
shareholder meeting.85 In other words, a shareholder who has maintained his ownership for five years wields identical influence—all
else being equal—to the shareholder who has maintained his ownership for five days. The problem with this model is evident when it
comes time for shareholders to elect directors to the board.86 If directors implement a corporate policy that sacrifices some short-term
earnings in favor of long-term investment, they may be on the hot
seat at the next annual election. If, as is often the case, much of the
84. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
85. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 72 (1991) (describing the “one share, one vote” principle as “[t]he most
basic statutory rule of [corporate] voting”).
86. Divergent interests between short-term and long-term shareholders could also
arise in the context of mergers and acquisitions. See Jennifer E. Bethel et al., The Market
for Shareholder Voting Rights Around Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from Institutional Daily Trading and Voting, 15 J. CORP. FIN. 129, 129 (2009) (“A fundamental tenant
of shareholder governance is the right of shareholders to vote on key managerial decisions
such as mergers and acquisitions.”).
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voting stock resides in the hands of investors who have held—and
only intend to hold—stock for the short term, the directors will likely
find themselves out of a job.87 Practically, directors may not put forth
long-term corporate policies in the first place if the threat of removal
by short-sighted investors looms ahead.
To be clear, we cannot know for sure that the investor who held
stock for five years still intends to hold it in the future, just as we
cannot know that a new investor is only concerned with short-term
performance at the expense of long-term growth. But an ex post view
of the duration of ownership seems like the best proxy for predicting
the duration of future ownership.88 Moreover, because the tax scheme
discussed infra would incentivize long-term investing more so than
the current model does, investors would be more likely to own stock
for the long-term. One alternative would be to actually penalize
short-term stock ownership, either by tax penalties or, in the very
extreme, disgorgement of some short-term profits. But the loyalty
shares proposal is better because it recognizes that short-term strategies are not void of any benefits. Rather than try to stamp out shorttermism altogether, this proposal uses gradual incentives to entice
shareholders, while not drastically disincentivizing short-term trading for those who still desire to do so. The ultimate goal is to reach a
healthier balance between long- and short-term investment and governance than our present system does.
A system in which the voting power of a share increases in correlation with the length of time an investor holds the share allows investors with long-term horizons to have increased influence on corporate policies. Although the “one share, one vote” method is dominant
in United States corporations,89 approaches that alter the proportionality between ownership and control have been used before, primarily
in European and Canadian companies.90 Sometimes referred to as
“control enhancing mechanisms” (CEMs), these approaches include
multiple voting rights shares, non-voting shares, pyramid structures,
and voting rights ceilings, among others.91 Consequently, the task of
designing the appropriate structure for loyalty shares has some guidance. A study of CEMs showed multiple voting rights shares are
available in 53% of European Union member states, and have actually been implemented in 50% of those countries.92 The percentage of
87. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (describing the ability of short-term
investors to influence directors and corporate policy).
88. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing how using an ex post view of
duration to empower long-term shareholders in the hopes of alleviating short-termism was
endorsed in the SEC's proposed Rule 14a-11).
89. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 85, at 72.
90. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 92-93, 112.
91. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 23.
92. Id. at 18.
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companies within a given country who have implemented multiple
voting rights shares varies drastically, with the United Kingdom
(U.K.) at the low end (5%), and Sweden at the high end (80%).93
Importantly, many of the companies that adopt multiple voting
rights shares do so by creating distinct classes of shares, which are
bought and sold with the enhanced voting rights already attached.94
On the other hand, the common practice in France—for example—is
for voting rights to double only when the particular shareholder has
held the same share for a specific duration of time set out in the company’s bylaws (the duration must be at least two years).95 In the
French model, only the specific long-term investor who has owned the
stock for a set duration maintains the enhanced voting rights; they
dissolve upon sale.96
Although primarily a feature of corporate governance in France,
shares with voting rights that increase after a certain period of ownership are (rarely) found in the United States. A study by the European Commission revealed that nine out of 4399 United States companies sampled (0.2%) granted shareholders some form of loyalty
votes.97 In those companies, common stock generally received five or
ten votes per share after being held for four years.98
This Note’s proposal envisions a more gradual enhancement of
voting rights. Instead of having a drastic doubling of voting rights
after two (or more) years, the voting rights attached to a particular
share would increase by one-twelfth every six months, for up to three
years.99 As shown infra, increasing voting rights in this manner
would correlate with the decreasing tax burden on capital gains derived from selling these shares.100 This approach would not suffer
from the all-or-nothing pitfalls inherent in a model that doubles voting rights one time after a certain period. Other shareholders and
potential investors would be able to see how the shareholders with
enhanced voting rights behave as their corporate control increases
and can then react as they see fit. Potential investors who see the
prospect of future value in the way a loyal shareholder’s track record
of corporate governance emerges would have notice and could invest
early. On the other hand, a current shareholder who believes the loy93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 27.
97. INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 81.
98. Id.
99. Under the one-share-one-vote model, an investor with twelve shares would always
have twelve votes at the annual election. In the loyalty shares model, the shareholder
would still have twelve votes initially, but would have thirteen votes after six months, fourteen votes after one year, fifteen votes after one and a half years, sixteen votes after two
years, seventeen votes after two and a half years, and eighteen votes after three years.
100. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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al shareholder’s track record reflects an irresponsible approach to
corporate governance can exit the company before its stock price
takes a downturn.
2. Concerns with Enhanced Voting Rights
Of course, with the presence of any CEM comes an increased ability for shareholders to gain control of the corporation. As indicated in
a study by Institutional Shareholder Services et al., some potential
investors fear that the presence of CEMs in European companies
could indicate a board might ignore minority shareholders’ interests,
prevent or restrict takeover bids and their potential share-price upside, and create conflicts of interest for significant shareholders and
their boards.101 The fact that some European crises were made possible by the existence of dominant shareholders is also concerning, as
some of them were able to extract benefits from the corporation at
the expense of other shareholders.102
But these issues present less of a threat in United States public
corporations, where the level of shareholder concentration is generally much lower than in European companies. In 2001, only 2% and
1.7% of United States companies listed on the Nasdaq and NYSE,
respectively, were under majority control.103 The next closest country
or region was the U.K. (2.4%), followed distantly by Sweden (26.3%),
and with Austria at the high end (68%).104 The percentage of widely
held companies in several European countries adds further perspective, revealing Italy at 20%, Germany at 50%, and France at 60%.105
On the other hand, 80% of United States companies are widely
held.106 These numbers suggest that, when compared with European
companies, United States public corporations are far less likely to
have their corporate policies dominated by any one shareholder.
Moreover, the higher concentration of ownership in European companies is presumably enhanced by the existence of multiple types of
CEMs, not just multiple voting rights shares (which are more similar
to loyalty shares).107 And to be sure, there are at least some benefits

101. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 87.
102. See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON THE PROPORTIONALITY BETWEEN CAPITAL AND CONTROL IN LISTED C OMPANIES 15-16 (2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/impact_assessment_122007.pdf.
103. MARCO BECHT, CURRENT ISSUES IN EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 4 (2003),
http://www.ecgi.de/conferences/euro_500_becht.pdf.
104. Id.
105. Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental
Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 119 (2007).
106. Id.
107. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 6 (stating “Control Enhancing
Mechanisms are rather common” in the 464 European companies considered and “[l]arge
companies in the European Union under analysis feature a variety of CEMs”).
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to a corporation that is not widely held, including an increased ability
for shareholders to monitor management.108
Despite the prevalence of widely held companies in the United
States, the enhanced voting rights attached to loyalty shares should
nonetheless be tempered. If not constructed properly, the method of
providing enhanced voting rights—as described thus far—could eventually lead to excessive proportionality differences between voting
rights and ownership. Such excesses have manifested themselves
within some European and Canadian companies. For example, a
shareholder in a large Italian company (i.e., a market capitalization
of $40 billion) controlled 18% of the votes—making it the largest
shareholder by far—yet held only 0.7% of the cash flow rights;109 a
German family controls 25.1% of Volkswagen AG despite owning only
9.44% of the cash flow rights;110 and even more startling, a single
family shareholder controlled 50% of the Stockholm stock exchange
through recourse to CEMs.111 In Canada, drastic proportionality differences are readily apparent at companies listed on the Toronto
Stock Exchange, including Magna International (where a shareholder owns 1% of equity and 56% of the voting power); Canadian Tire
(3%, 61%); and Shaw Communications (9%, 78%).112
Such drastic proportionality differences manifest problems in
many ways: namely, decreased liquidity;113 prevention of possible
takeover bids that could ultimately be favorable to non-controlling
shareholders;114 (as mentioned previously) providing an incentive to
shareholders whose control greatly exceeds their ownership rights to
extract value from the company at the expense of non-controlling
shareholders;115 and a misalignment of incentives between the controlling shareholder and non-controlling shareholders when the controlling shareholder’s voting power greatly exceeds her financial risk.116

108. See BECHT, supra note 103, at 5.
109. Enriques & Volpin, supra note 105, at 119.
110. Id. at 120-22.
111. See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., supra note 102, at 11.
112. See Robert Parizeau, Multiple Voting Shares and Governance, 122 INST. OF
CORP. DIRECTORS. 5, 6 (2005), available at http://pervinfamilybusiness.com/library/pdf/
multiple-voting-shares-governance.pdf.
113. See Edith Ginglinger & Jacques Hamon, Ownership, Control and Market Liquidity,
FINANCE 1-4 (forthcoming Dec. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2097795 (studying the “French institutional setting, which is
characterized by firms with concentrated ownership and large control -ownership deviations” and concluding that “deviation of control from ownership is associated with
lower liquidity”).
114. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 11.
115. See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., supra note 102, at 14.
116. See Parizeau, supra note 112, at 6-7 (“In my view, the structure of capital with
multiple voting shares can only be justified when the controlling shareholder owns a significant part of the company and, therefore, when that shareholder is much more at risk than
any other shareholder.”).
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3. Preventing Drastic Ownership-Control Proportionality Differences
These potential proportionality differences would be constrained
by including the following default rules in the loyalty shares provision. First, after three years the voting rights would no longer expand. For example, an investor who bought 12 shares of common
stock would see his voting rights enhanced by 50% (to 18 votes) if he
continued his ownership of those particular shares for three years.
Because the increments used to enhance voting rights would never
allow for more than a 50% increase in voting power, the excessive
proportionality differences cited above would be unobtainable.
Second, a voting rights ceiling attached only to loyalty shares
would ensure dominance does not result from long-term holdings
alone. United States companies that currently use voting rights ceilings generally set them at 10% of total outstanding shares.117 For the
sake of simplicity, assume a corporation has 200 shares of outstanding stock and the voting rights ceiling on loyalty shares is set at 9%.
An investor who held 12 shares for three years would have 18
votes.118 Therefore, the investor would own 6% of the corporation’s
stock and have 9% of the voting rights. Note that the investor has
reached the cap on allowable votes derived from loyalty shares. If the
investor purchases three more shares of stock, she will have 15
shares and 21 votes, meaning she will own 7.5% of the outstanding
stock and 10.5% of the votes. Because the investor previously hit the
votes ceiling on loyalty shares, the new shares she purchases will not
receive enhanced voting rights no matter how long she holds them.
By applying the voting rights ceiling only to loyalty shares, ambitious shareholders would still be able to increase their control
through normal market mechanisms (i.e., buying more shares). The
benefits of allowing shareholders to compete for control of corporations in which they see value will not be significantly deterred. The
three-year limit on enhanced voting rights—combined with the voting rights ceiling on loyalty shares—would allow a healthy, increased
influence from long-term shareholders, while preventing the dangers
seen with enhanced voting rights in Europe and Canada. Moreover,
because these accompanying provisions would be default rules, directors and shareholders would have the flexibility to adopt different
limits through private ordering if they are deemed more beneficial.

117. INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 81. By comparison, common voting rights ceilings in France include 6%, 10%, and 15%. Id. at 46.
118. To recap, the proportion of votes per loyalty share increases by 1/12 after six
months, 2/12 after one year, 3/12 after one-and-a-half years, 4/12 after two years, 5/12 after
two-and-a-half years, and 6/12 after three years.
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4. Additional Safeguards to Ensure the Success of Loyalty Shares
While the foregoing should largely suppress fears that shareholders with relatively small equity would dominate corporate policymaking, corporations could mitigate any remaining risks by adopting
additional measures (via default rules) already used by European
companies.119 These include standard corporate governance rules designed to prevent conflicts of interest (e.g., rules on related party
transactions, minority protection in the context of take-over bids, and
the prevention of market abuse).120 Certain rules could also require
transparency, such as disclosure obligations for enhanced voting
rights holders.121 Furthermore, there is an additional safeguard already present in United States corporate governance: Controlling
shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to non-controlling shareholders.122
Although the study by Institutional Shareholder Services et al.
indicated that many institutional investors had negative opinions of
multiple voting rights shares in European companies, some investors
instead indicated they were enticed to invest in companies with
CEMs, noting the potential for more responsible and committed
management.123 Importantly, the study did not distinguish investors’
sentiments based on the specific kinds of multiple voting rights
shares available;124 thus, it is impossible to infer from the study how
investors might feel about loyalty shares specifically. Even assuming
for the moment there would be some negative sentiment toward loyalty shares, the use of France’s relatively similar approach125 is as
prevalent in large French companies as in recently listed French
companies, “showing no decline in this practice.”126 Presumably, these
companies see the increased prospect of long-term sustainability that
is derived from rewarding long-term shareholders with more control.
Moreover, it is notable that 52% of the large-cap companies analyzed
in the study had CEMs while only 26% of recently listed companies
had them.127 When these numbers are compared with the prevalent
119. See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., supra note 102, at 20.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 21-22.
122. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987)
(“[A] shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest in or exercises
control over the business affairs of the corporation.”); Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 9, at
1265 (noting “courts have held that majority shareholders, like corporate officers and directors, owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to minority shareholders that precludes them from
using their positions as controlling shareholders to extract material economic benefits from
the firm at the minority’s expense”).
123. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 91-92.
124. Id. at 27 (detailing some of the different types of multiple voting rights shares in
particular countries, but summarizing respondents’ answers as “multiple voting rights
shares” generally).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
126. INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 44.
127. Id. at 6.
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use of France’s relatively similar approach to loyalty shares in both
large and recently listed companies, it indicates shares with loyalty
enhanced voting rights are the most preferred type of multiple voting
rights shares. Furthermore, the fact that roughly 40% of French public companies are owned by foreign investors suggests that—as a
general matter—investors are not hesitant to buy equity in companies with loyalty shares.128
5. Concerns About Principles of Shareholder Democracy
Critics may argue the enhanced voting rights attached to loyalty
shares violate the democratic principle of one-share-one-vote.129 But
this idealistic rationale overlooks the multitude of schemes already
used by corporations to alter the proportionality between ownership
and control. For example, many United States corporations already
issue dual-class shares—where one of the classes has either fewer
votes than the other or no votes at all—representing in the latter
case an infinite separation of ownership and control.130 Additionally,
corporate boards routinely adopt methods to entrench themselves
and stifle shareholders’ democratic power.131 Finally, shareholders
sometimes enter into agreements that control, in one way or
another, how they must vote in director elections and on other matters,132 and in the case of voting trusts, legal title to shares is actually

128. See, The French Investment Climate, AM. CHAMBER OF COM. IN FR. (Mar. 2010),
http://www.amchamfrance.org/theme1.php?idcontenu=107&idpage= (“Foreigners [held]
approximately 39% percent [sic] of the capital of large publicly traded French companies
(CAC 40) in December 2008.”); Paris Stock Exchange (PAR) .PA, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/paris-stock-exchange-par-.p.asp#axzz1s8NHLkQv
(last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (“Now known as the NYSE Euronext (NYX), the Paris Stock
Exchange trades both equities and derivatives and posts the CAC 40 Index. This index is
made up of French companies, although nearly half of these are owned by foreign entities.”).
129. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 85, at 72-73.
130. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 81.
131. See Jay B Kesten, Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth Revisited:
Theory and Evidence from a Recessionary Financial Market, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1609, 1611
(2010) (“Between 1990 and 2005, managerial entrenchment levels had remained more or
less stable. In 2006, however, average entrenchment spiked nearly 50% as measured by an
index of the six most impactful entrenchment devices: poison pills, staggered boards, executive golden parachutes, supermajority voting requirements for the approval of mergers,
and limitations on shareholders’ ability to amend corporate bylaws and charters . . . .”)
(footnote omitted).
132. See Annotation, Validity and Effect of Agreement Controlling the Vote of Corporate
Stock, 45 A.L.R.2d 799, 801-02 (describing various types of voting agreements and stating
“[a]lthough, in a relatively small number of cases, stockholders’ contracts by which the
manner in which they may vote their holdings is controlled have been held to be, by their
nature, fatally defective . . . the modern view on the question whether a stockholder's contract, by which the manner in which he may vote his holdings is controlled, is valid, appears to be that such contracts contain no inherent defect requiring that they be struck
down”) (footnotes omitted).
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transferred to trustees who vote them in accordance with the terms
of the trust instrument.133
The difference between those methods and the one proposed in
this Note is, with the latter, the altered proportionality is premised
on enhancing a long-term view of corporate governance, a path both
scholars and prominent investors have strongly endorsed.134 As detailed above, default safeguards—as well as the fiduciary duty a controlling shareholder owes to non-controlling shareholders—would
prevent abuses.135
C. Incentivizing Long-Term Ownership Through the Tax Code
While enhanced voting rights alone may entice some otherwise
short-term shareholders to invest over a longer time horizon, the
competition between institutional investors for clientele would likely
prevent a major shift.136 Until long-term shareholding becomes more
enticing from a financial perspective, the hands of institutional investors will be forced by the marketplace for end-users.137 This hurdle
could be cleared if institutional investors were able to advertise their
ability to distribute more favorable after-tax profits to end-users.
Several authors have supported the use of tax incentives to promote
long-term holdings.138 However, the manner in which this should be
done has often gone unexplained.139
These tax benefits should be aimed at the funds’ clients (i.e., their
end-users) because, first, the sustainability of institutional investors
depends on attracting clients, and second, institutional investors
themselves are generally pass-through entities for tax purposes.140

133. William S. Hochstetler & Mark D. Svejda, Statutory Needs of Close Corporations—An
Empirical Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation
Law?, 10 J. CORP. L. 849, 946 (1985).
134. See supra note 82.
135. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3-4.
136. See supra note 38 (describing the intense competition among institutional investors
for end-users).
137. See id.
138. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 8, at 18 (“Areas that would be productive for examination include . . . pricing and tax strategies to encourage investing and discourage churning
by institutional investors and ‘fund hopping’ by end-user investors . . . .”); Sparks & DiTomo, supra note 16, at 136 (supporting incentives for “long-term investments through revised regulation (e.g., preferential tax treatment)” as a way to address short-termism).
139. See Strine, supra note 8, at 18; Sparks & DiTomo, supra note 16, at 136.
140. See PRENTISS WILLSON, JR. & MARK WINDFELD-HANSEN, STATE TAXATION
OF PASS-THROUGH ENTITIES: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (PORTFOLIO 1500), available at
http://www.bna.com/State-Taxation-Entities-p7843/ (listing mutual funds as a commonly
used pass-through entity); Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73
TEMP. L. REV. 681, 683 (2000) (“Hedge funds are usually structured as private limited partnership[s] or limited liability companies to [maintain] pass through tax treatment.”); USA
Taxation: Funds and Fund Management 2010: KPMG, 1 http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/
IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/mtUSA-Funds-Mtg-taxation-2010.pdf
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Under the current tax model, an end-user who buys shares in an institutional investment fund will be taxed on the capital gains generated from the fund’s sale of stock, whether those gains are distributed to the end-user or reinvested in the fund.141 If the fund holds the
stock for over a year before selling it, the gains or losses will be taxed
at a preferential long-term capital gains rate.142 Generally, long-term
capital gains are subject to a 15% rate.143 On the other hand, shortterm capital gains are subject to ordinary federal income tax rates,
which can be as high as 35%.144
Because the preferential capital gains rate for stock plateaus after
one year, there is no direct financial incentive for investors to hold
stock for longer durations.145 Moreover, by not providing any incentives prior to the one-year mark, many investors who hold stock for
short durations (e.g., six months or less) may be indifferent to the
prospect of long-term capital gains because realization of them is so
far into the future.
(describing the ability of investment companies to choose regulated investment company
status, which affords them pass-through tax treatment).
141. See Internal Revenue Serv., Mutual Fund Distributions, 564 IRS FORMS AND PUBLICATIONS 1, 3 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p564--2009.pdf (“You
must report the reinvested amounts [in mutual funds] the same way as you would
report them if you received them in cash.”); Mutual Fund Taxes, WELLS FARGO,
https://www.wellsfargo.com/tax_center/taking_control/investments/mutual_fund_taxes/
(last visited Feb. 18, 2013); Inv. Co. Inst., Taxation of Mutual Fund Shareholders, FUNDING
YOUR FUTURE, http://www.fundingyourfuture.org/solution/fundshares.html (last visited
Feb. 18, 2013) (“Under current law, mutual fund shareholders are taxed on a fund’s distributions of income and gains, regardless of whether the distributions are received in cash or
reinvested in additional fund shares.”).
142. See 26 U.S.C. § 1222(3) (2006) (defining “long-term capital gain” as “gain from the
sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year”).
143. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2006); see also Topic 409- Capital Gains and Losses, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409.html (last updated Nov. 7, 2012) (“Generally, net capital
gain is taxed at rates no higher than 15%.”).
144. Mutual Fund Taxes, supra note 141.
145. See Sparks & DiTomo, supra note 16, at 129 (“Lastly, because preferential capital
gains rates are available to investors after they hold their investment for only 1 year, investors are not encourage[d] to hold an investment for longer periods.”). Congress has altered the holding period that triggers the preferential capital gains rate on several occasions. In 1921, the alternative maximum rate for capital gains applied to capital assets
held for more than two years. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG.,
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS JCX-4-98
(1998), available at http://www.jct.gov/jct_html/x-4-98.htm. In 1934, the exclusion of varying percentages of capital gains and losses depended on holding periods of one to two years,
two to five years, five to ten years, and over ten years. Id. In 1938, Congress implemented
relevant holding periods of 18 months to two years, and over two years. Id. In 1942, Congress provided preferential treatment for capital assets held for more than six months. Id.
The holding period was increased to nine months in 1977 and one year in 1978—with the
latter holding period remaining largely in effect up to the present time. Id. The current
15% rate on capital assets held for over one year is a matter of public debate, and could
increase to 20% for those assets in the near future, with an 18% rate on gains from
assets acquired after December 31, 2000 and held for over five years. See Bill Bischoff,
Preparing for the End of the Bush Tax Cuts, WALL ST. J., (May 18, 2012, 5:32 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303879604577410143118102490.html.
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A simple method to ensure investors have reasonable financial
incentives to hold stock for the long-term is to align the capital gains
rate on loyalty shares with the incremental periods for enhanced voting rights previously discussed.146 This can be accomplished by applying a 17.5% rate to gains on stocks held for over six months; 15% for
over one year; 12.5% for over one and a half years, 10% for over two
years, 7.5% for over two and a half years, and 5% for over three
years. This method would provide short-term traders with a realistic
incentive to hold stock for a longer period of time, even when the
current one-year mark seems too distant from their usual investment horizon to be worth consideration. This method would also
provide incentives for investors to hold stock for longer than the current one-year mark.147
In fashioning a new capital gains structure, one must be cognizant
of potential market inefficiencies.148 A capital gains rate of any kind
can disrupt efficient market allocation through the lock-in effect, discouraging the sale of an asset that would otherwise occur in the ab146. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
147. The U.K. has experimented with a tax scheme based on similar principles. In
1998, it introduced “taper relief,” whereby “the amount of gain charged to tax [capital assets] would be reduced the longer an asset had been held at the time of its disposal.” See
ANTONY SEELY, CAPITAL GAINS TAX: BACKGROUND HISTORY 12 (2010), available at
www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN00860.pdf. The goal was to “increase the quantity
and quality of long-term investment.” Id. The scheme provided that, for non-business assets, 100% of the gain would be taxed for an asset held for less than three years; 95% of the
gain would be taxed for an asset held for three years; and, every additional year held
thereafter would decrease the percentage of the gain that would be taxed by 5%, down to a
minimum of 60% of the gain taxed for ten years or more. See LUCY CHENNELLS ET AL., A
SURVEY OF THE UK TAX SYSTEM 11 (2000), available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/bns/
taxsurvey2000.pdf. For business assets, the rate was 87.5% for one year, 75% for two years,
50% for three years, and 25% for four years or more. Id. Taper relief was withdrawn in
2007 and replaced with a different scheme of taxation for capital gains. See SEELY, supra,
at 1. Although some supported the withdrawal of taper relief, asserting its implementation
had little effect on increasing long-term investment and entrepreneurship, see id. at 22-23,
a group of business group leaders argued “[t]he impact of the decision will be felt throughout the economy. The net effect will be to set back the growth of the economy over coming
years, by discouraging longer-term investment and risk-taking.” David Frost et al., Open
Letter to Chancellor Alistair Darling, BUSINESSZONE (Oct. 15, 2007, 4:16 PM),
http://www.businesszone.co.uk/item/174278 (stating concerns in a letter signed by the Director General of the British Chambers of Commerce, the Director General of the CBI lobbying organization, the National Chairman of the Federation of Small Businesses, and the
Director General of the Institute of Directors). Note that the tax scheme outlined in this
paper contains far fewer holding period distinctions—and is thus less complex—than the
U.K.’s taper relief scheme.
148. See generally George R. Zodrow, Economic Analyses of Capital Gains Taxation:
Realizations, Revenues, Efficiency and Equity, 48 TAX L. REV. 419, 424-29 (1993) (reviewing
some of the existing literature on the effect of capital gains rates on the market). “Economists long have noted the efficiency cost imposed by the lock-in effect. Specifically, under a
capital gains tax based on the realization principle, the imposition of tax only upon sale or
exchange of an asset implies that investors are reluctant to sell assets with accrued gains;
that is, the opportunity to defer tax by holding the asset discourages sales that would occur
in the absence of taxation.” Id. at 467.
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sence of taxation.149 By adding more increments to the current oneyear model, overall market efficiency could theoretically be disrupted
even more than may already be the case.150 Additionally, an argument can be made that the market loses efficiency whenever more
complexity is added to the tax code.151
But drawing such conclusions is risky because much of the traditional literature on the subject is inconclusive.152 Regardless, certain
features of the model presented in this Note should alleviate many of
those concerns. First, the 15% tax rate on stocks held for over one
year, which Congress has already deemed appropriate, is preserved.
Second, any potential inefficiencies can be justified by the goal of
gradually increasing long-term corporate governance. As argued
throughout this Note, decreasing short-termism to a healthier level
would have widespread benefits. Consequently, policy-makers should
be willing to sacrifice some level of potential market efficiency if it
would result in a more beneficial financial sector overall. Third, the
proposed tax scheme does not significantly increase complexity. Instead, the investor is provided with a consistent and simple capital
gains scheme. Well-respected and highly-influential investors have
already endorsed the use of modified capital gains rates that encourage long-term share ownership.153 By aligning the capital gains rates
for loyalty shares with the accompanying enhanced voting rights, investors and corporations could easily weigh the pros and cons associated with loyalty shares before deciding whether to adopt them.
V. CONCLUSION
Because public corporations play a vital role in the American
economy, the focus by institutional investors on short-term earnings
at the expense of long-term growth presents serious problems. These
include decreased investment in R&D and capital infrastructure, as
well as the termination of employees. Unless major changes are made
to the corporate landscape, there is no reason to think these problems
will subside in the future. Although the issue of short-termism has
149. Id.
150. See Daniel J. Kovenock & Michael Rothschild, Notes on the Effect of Capital Gain
Taxation on Non-Austrian Assets, in ECONOMIC POLICY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 309, 31319 (Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka eds., 1987) (suggesting the capital gains rate may cause
significant losses attributable to reduced portfolio management).
151. See Chris Edwards, Income Tax Rife with Complexity and Inefficiency, TAX &
BUDGET BULL. NO. 33 (Cato Inst., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb-0604-33.pdf (describing how complexity in the tax code
impedes efficient economic decision-making for businesses and individuals).
152. See generally Zodrow, supra note 148 (detailing empirical evidence on the subject
and noting the difficulty in finding conclusive answers).
153. See BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, supra note 46, at 3 (suggesting policy-makers “[r]evise
capital gains tax provisions or implement an excise tax in ways that are designed to discourage excessive share trading and encourage longer-term share ownership”).
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not gone unnoticed, many legislative efforts and scholarly papers
have failed to provide adequate solutions.
This Note proposes using the tax code to entice more shareholders
to invest long-term and then granting them increased control via enhanced voting rights. By learning from the experiences of European
and Canadian companies with other types of control enhancing
mechanisms and incorporating many of their procedural safeguards
as default rules, the potential pitfalls of this proposal are avoided.
Adoption of this proposal would ultimately cause a renewed focus on
long-term corporate governance, without eliminating many of the
benefits that accompany short-term trading.

